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TOWARD UNIFORM GUARDIANSHIP 
LEGISLATION 
William F. Pratcher* 
T HE Model Probate Code,1 part IV of which covers gua7:dianship of the persons and property of infants and mental incompetents, 
was published in 1946 under the auspices of the University of Mich-
igan Law School. It was prepared for the Probate Law Division of 
the Section of Real Property, Probate, and Trust Law of the Amer-
ican Bar Association by its Model Probate Code Committee in coop-
eration with the research staff of the Law School.2 No state has 
adopted the Model Probate Code in its entirety, but parts of it have 
been enacted in Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, 
Illinois, Indiana, Missouri, North Carolina, Oregon, and Texas, and 
it has influenced legislation elsewhere, notably in Pennsylvania. In 
1962 the American Bar Association Section of Real Property, Pro-
bate, and Trust Law established the Special Committee on Revision 
of Model Probate Code, and the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws organized the Uniform Probate Code 
Committee. Under the guidance of these two committees, a Report-
ing Staff headed by Professor William J. Pierce8 is engaged in 
drafting a revised and expanded version of the 1946 Model Probate 
Code designed for promulgation by the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws as a Uniform Probate Code.4 
Among the drafts currently under consideration by the committees 
and the Reporting Staff is the First Tentative Draft of Revised Part 
IV, Model Probate Code, entitled "Protection of Persons Under 
• Professor of Law, University of Missouri; Member and former Research Director, 
Special Committee on Revision of Model Probate Code, Section of Real Property, Pro-
bate and Trust Law, American Bar Association; Member of the Reporting Staff for the 
Uniform Probate Code.-Ed. 
1. SIMES, MODEL PROBATE CoDE (1946) [hereinafter cited as MPC]. 
2. The subcommittee on drafting consisted of Rufford G. Patton, of the Minnesota 
Bar; Lewis M. Simes, Professor of Law and Director of Legal Research at the University 
of Michigan; Thomas E. Atkinson, Professor of Law at the University of Missouri; and 
Paul E. Basye, Research Associate in Law at the University of Michigan. 
3. Professor of Law and Director of the Legislative Research Center, University of 
Michigan; Chairman of the Executive Committee, National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws. Professor Richard V. Wellman of the University of 
Michigan Law School is Staff Director during the current year. 
4. See generally Report of the Special Committee on Revision of Model Probate 
Code, 1963 PROCEEDINGS, AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION SEC'IION OF REAL PROPERTY, PRO-
BATE AND TRUST LAW pt. I, 17, 81; 1964 HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF 
COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 13; Fratcher &: Straus, Model Probate Code, 
35 Pa. B.A.Q. 206 (1964). 
[983] 
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Disability and Their Property."6 Some of the problems which this 
draft is designed to solve may be of interest to the profession. 
I. SOURCE OF THE PROBLEM: THE LINGERING p AST 
The law of guardianship in the United States was developed pri-
marily to meet the problem of protecting the person and property 
of the orphan in a rural community with closely knit families. Such 
a child ordinarily owned only the whole of, or an undivided interest 
in, a family-sized farm. The task of the guardian was to find a suit-
able short-term tenant for the farm and to apply the rent to the 
support of the ward. Ordinarily there was no problem of investment 
because the income from the farm was no more than enough to 
support and educate the ward. Sale of the land was not anticipated 
because it was expected that the ward would work the farm himself 
when he reached majority. In a society with short life expectancies 
and few tensions, mentally incompetent adults of substantial means 
were relatively rare. In the few instances when adults were afflicted 
with serious mental disorders, their persons and property could 
usually be protected adequately without guardianship. The mental 
incompetent's wife and children simply worked the family farm 
and used its product for the support of the whole family, while he 
sat on his own front stoop or on a bench at the asylum. 
In view of the context in which it developed, it is not surprising 
that the American law of guardianship conferred clear authority for 
very few property transactions. The guardian could conduct, on 
behalf of his ward, whatever litigation was necessary to collect and 
protect the ward's property.6 He could also lease the ward's land 
for terms which would not outlast the guardianship,7 and he was 
generally authorized to sell the ward's personal property for cash, 
if funds were needed to pay debts or expenses of administration or 
5. [Hereinafter cited as ITD.] This draft was prepared by the present writer in con-
formity to the replies to·a lengthy questionnaire sent to thirty-one expertenced judges, 
practicing lawyers, and law teachers in thirteen states. The recipients of the question-
naire were members of the Special Committee on Uniform Probate Code of the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, the Special Committee on Revi-
sion of Model Probate Code of the American Bar Association Section of Real Property, 
Probate and Trust Law, and a specially constituted advisory committee of experts. Sec 
Fratcher &: Straus, supra note 4, at 210-11. The draft is dated July IO, 1965, but at the 
time this article was written the draft had not yet been discussed by the Reporting 
Staff or its guiding committees and may, of course, undergo substantial change in their 
hands. 
6. See Fratcher, Powers and Duties of Guardians of Property, 45 IowA L. REv. 264, 
294 (1960). 
7. Id. at 301. 
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to support and educate the ward and his dependents.8 The guardian 
could invest his ward's surplus funds in a few types of securities, pri-
marily first mortgages on land worth twice the amount loaned, but 
many states have required prior court authorization or subsequent 
court approval for the making of even such obviously conservative 
investments.9 Finally, the court could authorize him to sell or mort-
gage the ward's land.10 Beyond these few types of property trans-
actions, both the power of a guardian to act without court authoriza-
tion and the power of the court to authorize action become highly 
doubtful. 
Although guardians may feel that prudent management requires 
greater freedom in dealing with a ward's property, they are reluctant 
to act, in light of the risk of incurring heavy liability. Similarly, 
third parties are hesitant to enter into transactions with a guardian, 
feeling that the guardian may lack authority either to sell the guard-
ianship assets or to enter into other contractual arrangements in-
volving the ward's property. If the circumstances require action 
beyond that within the traditional powers of the guar:dian, the 
ward must suffer the consequences of inaction, for want of anyone 
with clear power to act .. Thus, it is obvious that the traditional 
powers of guardians are inadequate for the acquisition, retention, 
and management of an extensive and well diversified portfolio of 
securities, an active business, or a group of urban real estate invest-
ments, such as apartment houses or commercial buildings. In short, 
unless the ward is very poor or owns only a small home or farm, 
his property cannot be managed efficiently under the traditional 
American scheme of guardianship. 
It is clear that our system of guardianship is woefully ,out of date 
and inadequate.11 That lawyers have not exerted greater pressure 
8. Id. at 308. 
9. Id. at 270-88. 
10. Id. at 302-04. 
11. The English law of guardianship of the property of infants, from which the 
American system was originally derived, is equally out of date and inadequate, but this 
causes no trouble because it is no longer used. Under current English statutes, court 
rules, and judicial practice, property of infants is managed by trustees with broad and 
adequate powers conferred by statute. See Fratcher, Fiduciary Administration in 
England, 40 N.Y.U.L. R.Ev. 12, 73-80 (1965). The English law governing the management 
of property and affairs of mental incompetents was modernized and cgdified by Part 
VIII of the Mental Health Act, 1959, 7 & 8 Eliz. 2, c. 72, §§ 100-21, and by comprehen-
sive rules issued thereunder. See the Court of Protection Rules, [1960] Stat. Instr. 1935, 
(No. 1146 (L.7)), as amended, The Court of Protection (Amendment) Rules, [1962] Stat. 
Instr. 529 (No. 553 (L.7)). For a discussion of the Mental Health Act, see Fratcher, 
supra, at 80-96. The draft under consideration owes much to the provisions of this 
legislation. 
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for its modernization may be because those who guide wealthy fam-
ilies have usually been able to avoid guardianship of property by 
the use of trusts and other devices, and because academic lawyers 
have little awareness of the problem, since guardianship is not 
included in law school curricula. There is a marked dearth of liter-
ature on the topic, nothing of real consequence having been pub-
lished during the period from Judge Woemer's 1897 treatise12 until 
the Iowa Law Review symposium of 1960.13 
It is equally clear that lawyers who know much about guardian-
ship of property avoid it whenever possible as a mea~s of protecting 
the welfare of a minor or an incompetent.14 Both Congress and the 
state legislatures have enacted statutes to facilitate avoidance of 
the guardianship system. Numerous statutes authorize federal agen-
cies to pay out funds to or for minors and incompetents without the 
intervention of a guardian appointed and supervised by the state.111 
The Uniform Gifts to Minors Act, which has been adopted, at least 
in substance, in every state,16 provides a cheap, efficient system for 
the management of a donee's securities by a custodian who has ade-
quate powers of management which he can exercise without court 
authorization or supervision. The Uniform Law Commissioners' 
Model Special Power of Attorney for Small Property Interests Act17 
provides a similar system for persons who anticipate approaching 
incompetence due to senility or similar causes. 
Despite the flexibility of the trust device in the hands of a skilled 
lawyer, the useful federal devices for avoiding guardianship, and the 
modem substitutes for guardianship offered by the various uniform 
acts, it is impossible in many cases to keep substantial accumulations 
of property from falling into the grasp of our archaic system of 
guardianship, which lacks the means for efficient management. Even 
though a parent may have set up a testamentary trust and thereby 
avoided guardianship of the property provided for in his will, a 
minor whose father dies shortly before his grandfather may inherit 
directly property which the grandfather intended to go to the father. 
Furthermore, an orphan's cause of action for the ·wrongful death of 
12. WOERNER, THE AMERICAN LAW OF GUARDIANSHIP (1897), 
13. Atkinson, et al., Symposium on Guardianship, 45 IOWA L. REv. 209-419 (1960). 
14. Atkinson, Foreword to Symposium on Guardianship, 45 IowA L. REv. 209, 211 
(1960). 
15. E.g., 37 U.S.C. § 602 (1964) (payments by Secretary of the Army to mental in-
competents); 38 U.S.C. §§ 170l(c), 3202 (1964) (war orphans educational assistance); 20 
C.F.R. § 404.1601 (1965). 
16. See Fratcher, Trustees' Powers Legislation, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 627, 628 (1962). 
17. 1964 HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM 
STATE LAws 273, 275. 
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his parents may be a very substantial asset which can be realized only 
by a guardian, and a wealthy man may be incapacitated without 
warning by a stroke.18 There is urgent need for replacement of the 
traditional system of property guardianship with a modem system 
which will permit the cheap and efficient management which is possi-
ble with a trust, a custodianship under the Uniform Gifts to Minors 
· Act, and an attomeyship in fact under the Uniform Law Commis-
sioners' Model Special Power of Attorney for Small Property In-
terests Act. · 
!I. WEAKNESSES OF PART IV OF THE 1946 MODEL PROBATE CODE 
A. Adoption of the General Scheme of the 
Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act 
The 1946 Model Probate Code was carefully drafted by able 
lawyers, and contains many excellent provisions which clarify and 
improve the law of guardianship.19 These provisions should be re-
tained in any revision of the Code. On balance, h<:>wever, part IV of 
the 1946 Model Probate Code, instead of providing a modem, cheap, 
and efficient system for the management of the property of minors 
and incompetents, aggravates the worst weaknesses of the traditional 
system by depriving guardians of the few powers which they could 
formerly exercise without court authorization, notably those of 
18. See generally Report of the Committee on Administration of Property of Persons 
Under Disability, 1965 PROCEEDINGS, AMERICAN BAR AssocIATION SECTION OF REAL PROP· 
ERTY, PROBATE AND TRUST LAW pt. I, 58. 
19. For example, it improves upon the traditional system of guardianship by clarify-
ing the power of the courts to authorize both the continuation of a ward's business (MPC 
§§ 131, 222) and investments of types permitted for trustees (MPG § 225). Section 227 
permits creditors of both the ward and the guardian to file claims in the guardianship 
proceeding for direct payment from the ward's funds. This procedure is a marked im-
provement over the traditional system, under which creditors of the guardian had to 
exhaust their remedies against the guardian personally before they could proceed against 
the ward's property. Section 235, which permits the guardian to administer a deceased 
ward's estate, is a sensible device calculated to save time and expense, so long as the 
guardian is appointed by and responsible to the same court which appoints adminis-
trators. Section 237, which permits dispensing with guardianship in certain cases, is also 
an improvement over -the traditional system. Section 201 provides helpful clarification of 
the rulers of venue in guardianship proceedings and permits transfer of such proceed-
ings between courts. Section 205 permits a single guardianship proceeding when there 
are several wards from the same family who are of a common parent, parent and 
child, or husband and wife. Section 209 permits interested parties, including agencies 
which are caring for or paying benefits to the ward, to request and receive notices of 
hearings in guardianship proceedings. Section 215 permits summary appointment of a 
temporary guardian. Section 228(c) bars attachment and execution against property 
under guardianship. Section 229(b) permits the court to approve the compromise of a 
claim in favor of a minor ward, for personal injury or otherwise, without appointing 
a guardian. Section 231 provides safeguards against the acts of a guardian working an 
ademption of specific devises and bequests. 
988 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 64:983 
making short-term leases of land,20 investing funds,21 and selling 
personal property.22 The explanation for this anomaly may lie in 
the fact that the draftsmen were required by their terms of reference 
to incorporate without change the provisions of the Uniform Veter-
ans' Guardianship Act of 1942,23 and the general scheme of the latter 
act was utilized throughout part IV of the Model Probate Code. As 
a result, the Model Code is based upon two general principles. First, 
in the absence of prior authorization by court order after a hearing, 
the guardian should be powerless to act with reference to the ward's 
property. Second, the power of the court to authorize a guardian 
to act with reference to his ward's property should be narrowly cir-
cumscribed. Both principles are, of course, inimical to economical 
and efficient management of large aggregations of property ·of varied 
types. However, if the basic administrative provisions of the Uni-
form Veterans' Guardianship Act had not been extended to all types 
of guardianships, the Model Code would have established two diver-
gent systems based upon fundamentally contradictory principles. 
Most of the states have enacted either the 1928 or the 1942 
version of the Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act.24 The move-
ment for this legislation appears to have been inspired by difficulties 
which the Veterans Administration was encountering with guardian-
ships of minor and incompetent pensioners in some states during the 
period between the First and Second World Wars. Throughout 
this period most beneficiaries of the Veterans Administration were 
20. Section 230 of the MPC requires prior court authorization for every lease of 
land, no matter how short. Consider what this means in terms of delay, expense, and 
loss of desirable tenants when the ward owns several large apartment houses with 
numerous apartments customarily leased for one-year terms. 
21. Sections 225 and 250 of the MPC, which correspond to § 13 of the Uniform 
Veterans' Guardianship Act, require a prior order of the court before guardians 
may invest in anything except bonds of the state and the United States or obligations 
guaranteed by the United States, and guardians must report to the court on the day 
of purchase of even these excepted securities. These sections could be read as preclud-
ing even a deposit in an insured savings and loan association without a prior court 
order. In the case of funds of a ward who has at any time received money from the 
Veterans Administration, the court order may be entered only after fifteen days' notice 
to the Veterans Administration (MPC § 247). 
22. See MPC § 230. Section 159 of the MPC, which is incorporated by reference in 
§ 230, may permit subsequent approval by the court of a sale of perishable or depreciat• 
ing personal property made without prior court authorization. Nevertheless, § 159 
would not permit a guardian of property to sell chickens and pigs produced on his 
ward's farm without a prior court order authorizing each individual sale, 
23. See Atkinson, The Law of Succession, 1948 ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW 
749, 750 (1949). 
24. See Fratcher, supra note 6, at 265. The Commissioners' prefatory note to the 
Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act, 9C UNIFORM LAws ANN. 318 (1957), gives the im-
pression that they thought the act was restricted to guardianships of disabled veterans. 
Actually, its most frequent application is likely to be to beneficiaries of National Service 
Life Insurance policies, most of whom are not veterans. 
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recipients of pensions which were conditioned on a severe financial-
means test; thus, most of them were .paupers who were wholly 
dependent upon their pensions for support. The guardian was likely 
to be an equally impecunious relative, who was often ignorant and 
sometimes dishonest. Some courts with guardianship jurisdiction 
were staffed by ignorant or corrupt judges, and thus provided in-
adequate supervision. Given this setting, the acceptance of the 
principles underlying the Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act is 
understandable;· indeed, they may be sound as applied to such a 
situation. The difficulty is that the act applies to every ward who 
has ever received any money from the Veterans Administration, re-
gardless of the nature of the payment or the extent of his property 
and other income. Prior to World War II few such wards had sub-
stantial means, but since then there have been many persons of 
property receiving disability compensation and proceeds o·f Na-
tional Service Life Insurance. Virtually eve_ryone who served in 
World War II has at least received a National Service Life Insurance 
dividend, and thus becomes subject to the act if placed under guard-
ianship. 
It may be difficult to determine whether an incompetent has 
ever received money from the Veterans Administration, and it is 
much more difficult to determine whether some of his property was 
acquired with money paid by the Veterans Administration to him 
or to some predecessor in title. Yet an order of a guardianship court 
may be void if the procedures of the act wer_e not followed. For 
example, if the court authorized the sale of a ward's land without 
knowledge of his prior receipt of a National Service Life Insurance 
dividend, the sale may be set aside upon a showing that this or some 
other money paid to someone by the Veterans Administration was, 
at some time, used to acquire the land.25 Hence, despite their simi-
larity, the very existence of two systems of guardianship under the 
1946 Model Probate Code is a grave .threat to the security of titles. 
B. Parallel Systems of Inefficient Guardianship 
As the foregoing discussion suggests, part IV of the 1946 Model 
Probate Code provides for two systems of guardianship of persons 
and property. One system, prescribed by sections 238-255 and based 
on the 1942 version of the Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act, is 
25. Sections 2, IO, and 13 of the Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act (MPC §§ 239, 
247, 250) give the impression that notice to the Veterans Administration is a jurisdic-
tional matter, if the property involved was acquired with money paid by the Veterans 
Administration and the ward has ever received money from it. 
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for the persons and the VA-tainted property-property acquired 
partially or wholly with money paid by the Veterans Administration 
or its predecessors26-of incompetents who have received money 
from the Veterans Administration, such as pensions- and payments 
under National Service Life Insurance policies. The other system, 
set forth in sections 198-237, is for all other persons, for property 
which is not VA-tainted, whether or not its owner is a present or 
former payee of the Veterans Administration, and for VA-tainted 
property owned by an incompetent who is not a present or former 
beneficiary of the Veterans Administration. The 1946 Model Probate 
Code does not provide special systems of guardianship for any other 
receipts from the federal government, such as Social Security bene-
fits, civil service retirement pay, or military retirement pay. 
Sections 225, 229, 230, and 250 require the guardian to secure 
court authorization before making an investment other than in 
federal or state bonds or obligations guaranteed by the United 
States, compromising a claim by or against the ward, or selling, 
mortgaging, leasing,,or exchanging real or personal property of the 
ward. In the case of VA-tainted property of a ward who has received 
money from the Veterans Administration, the latter must be given 
at least fifteen days notice of the hearing.27 It is quite evident that 
these requirements are both complex and burdensome. In this re-
gard it is interesting to note that fifteen years after the Code was 
promulgated the chief draftsman of the guardianship provisions 
stated that "the principal problems of property guardianship have 
not been losses due to dishonesty or incompetence of the fiduciary 
but rather to the red tape and expense of the court supervised 
administration.''28 
III. PROTECTION OF PERSONS UNDER DISABILITY 
The portion of the 1946 Model Probate Code which incorporates 
the Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act makes no distinction be-
tween guardianship of persons and of property, and has no provi-
sions concerning the responsibilities of a guardian appointed for 
the protection of the person of his ward.29 The other parts of the 
Model Code recognize that only guardianship of the person or of 
26. See MPC § 238 and text accompanying note 58 infra. 
27. See MPC § 239. 
28. Atkinson, supra note 14, at 210-11. 
29. Section 238 of the MPC defines "guardian" as "any fiduciary for the person or 
estate of a ward,'' but there is no other mention in the act of the guardian's powers 
and duties with respect to the ward's person. 
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property may be needed in a particular case, but there is a single 
system, based upon a single adjudication of incompetency, for both 
types of supervision.30 The First Tentative Draft of Revised Part 
IV, Model Probate Code, like the English Mental Health Act of 
1959,31 establishes sharply distinct systems for guardianship of the 
person and protection of property,32 and provides that an adjudica-
tion that a person is incompetent to care for his person has no 
bearing on the issue of his ability to manage his property and affairs.33 
. A. Statutory Guardians 
Under English law a surviving parent is automatically the 
statutory guardian ·of the person of his minor child, and a parent 
may appoint a "testamentary" guardian for his minor child by deed 
or will.34 Some American states have retained comparable arrange-
ments for the designation of guardians of the persons of minors 
without judicial appointment, but the 1946 Model Probate Code 
makes no provision for guardians other than those appointed by a 
court.85 The Tentative Draft makes the first qualified person on a 
prescribed list the statutory guardian of the person of an infant; 
the list consists of the infant's (1) spouse, (2) father, (3) mother, (4) 
testamentary guardian appointed by the father's will, and (5) 
testamentary guardian appointed by the mother's will.86 This sec-
tion is designed to eliminate, in most cases, the necessity for 
judicial proceedings to secure the appointment of guardians of the 
persons of infants. Provision is made for judicial removal of a 
statutory guardian upon a showing of good cause and for judicial 
appointment of a guardian of the person of an infant who has no 
statutory guardian. 37 
30. See MPC §§ 200, 202-04, 208, 210-13, 219-21. 
31. 7 &: 8 Eliz. 2, c. 72, §§ 25-51, 100-02. See Fratcher, supra note 11, at 81. 
32. Sections 40l(a)-(d) and 404-17 of the FTD relate to guardianship of the person; 
§§ 401(£)-(j) and 418-39 relate to the protection of property. The scheme for protection 
of property is by means of a trust created and supervised by a court of equity in what 
is called a "curatelic proceeding." 
33. FTD §§ 40l(b), 407. Conversely, an adjudication of inability to manage property 
and other affairs effectively has no bearing on the issue of a person's competence to 
care for his own person. See FTD §§ 401(£), 418. 
34. Guardianship of Infants Act, 1925, 15 &: 16 Geo. 5, c. 45, §§ 4, 5. See Fratcher, 
supra note 11, at 76. 
35. MPC § 199. Section 203 of the MPC admonishes the court, in appointing a 
guardian, to have "due regard to .•• any request for the appointment contained in 
a will or other written instrument executed by the parent for the appointment as 
guardian of his minor child." 
36. FTD § 404. The guardian must be a resident of the state. Ibid. 
37. FTD §§ 404-05. 
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B. Court-Appointed Guardians 
The Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act requires that every 
petition for the appointment of a guardian for a mental incompetent 
"show that such ward has been rated incompetent by the Veterans 
Administration."88 It also provides that a certificate issued by the 
Administrator of Veterans' Affairs or his duly authorized represen-
tative indicating that the person has been rated incompetent .. shall 
be prima facie evidence of the necessity for such appointment."89 
The latter provision has been held to authorize the appointment of 
a guardian without any other evidence of incompetency, even though 
the court deems the person to be competent.40 The general provisions 
of the 1946 Model Probate Code make an adjudication of incom-
petency a prerequisite to the appointment of a guardian of the 
person of a mental incompetent,41 but there is no specification of the 
procedure or evidence required for such an adjudication. 
The Tentative Draft also makes an adjudication of incompetency 
a prerequisite to the appointment of a guardian of the person of 
a mental incompetent, but it sets out in detail the procedure for 
such an adjudication.42 It permits the inc;ompetent himself, or any 
other person interested in his welfare, to petition for the appoint-
ment of a guardian of the person. A certificate from the Veterans 
Administration is neither required nor given weight.48 The in-
competent is entitled to personal notice of the hearing; he can waive 
notice only by attending the hearing or by confirming the waiver 
in an interview with a court-appointed visitor, who must be an 
independent person trained in law or social ,vork.44 The section 
38. UNIFORM VETERANS' GUARDIANSHIP Acr § 5(4) (MPC § 242(d)). This requirement 
probably cannot be met in the case of a person who is merely a payee of National Ser• 
vice Life Insurance proceeds. 
39. UNIFORM VETERANS' GUARDIANSHIP ·Acr § 6 (MPC § 243). 
40. Morse v. Caldwell, 55 Ga. App. 804, 191 S.E. 479 (1937); see Annot., 173 A.L.R. 
1061, 1070 (1948); cf. In the Matter of the Estate of Rickell, 158 Md. 654, 149 Atl. 446 
(1930). 
41. See, e.g., MPC § 211. This section requires "sufficient competent evidence in a 
proceeding instituted for that purpose as provided by law." The comment contemplates 
that "other legislation" regulating such proceedings will be enacted, This approach 
leaves the section open to the construction that § 6 of the Uniform Veterans' Guardian• 
ship Act (MPC § 243) is such "other legislation." However, under this interpretation 
a payee of the Veterans Administration could be railroaded into guardianship on a 
mere certificate of an official of the Veterans Administration who has never seen or 
examined him. Cf. text accompanying note 39 supra. 
42. FTD §§ 406·08. 
43. Cf. FTD § 418, which provides that, in a proceeding for determination of in• 
ability to manage property, "a certificate of an official of a federal, state, or municipal 
agency which has been, is, or plans to, pay benefits to or for the disabled is evidence 
of the need for curatelic proceedings but not of disability." 
44. FTD §§ 40l(k), 408. Notice to the incompetent's spouse, parents, and at least one 
adult relative is also required. 
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dealing with adjudication of incompetence is designed to furnish 
adequate safeguards against competent persons being deprived of 
their liberty through the wiles of evilly disposed individuals who 
wish to control them or get them out of the way. In addition, this 
section provides for a private hearing in chambers when the alleged 
incompetent wishes to avoid the unpleasantness and publicity of a 
public hearing.45 
With respect to the appointment of a guardian for a minor, the 
1946 Model Probate Code provides that the parents of an unmarried 
minor are entitled to the highest order of preference. Subject to 
this requirement, the court may appoint anyone who is willing to 
serve, giving due regard to nominations in the will of a deceased 
parent, nominations by a minor over fourteen years of age, and 
family relationships.46 Regard is to be given to the spouse's wishes 
and family relationships in appointing the guardian of a mental 
incompetent.47 The Tentative Draft confers preference for court 
appointment as guardian of the person of either a minor or a mental 
incompetent to (1) a nominee of the infant or incompetent if he 
has reached fourteen and has sufficient mental capacity to make an 
intelligent choice; (2) his spouse; (3) his parents; (4) a person 
nominated in the will of a deceased parent; (5) his children; (6) 
his next of kin; (7) the nominee .of a person or agency caring for 
45. FTD § 407 provides: "Upon petition of an alleged but unadjudicated incom-
petent or any person interested in his welfare for the appointment of a guardian of the 
person, the court shall set a date for hearing on the issue of competence. Unless the 
alleged incompetent has counsel, the court shall appoint an independent lawyer to 
represent him in the proceeding. The alleged incompetent shall be examined by an 
independent physician, not connected with any institution in which he is a patient, 
appointed by the court, and interviewed by a visitor sent by the court. The alleged 
incompetent shall be entitled to be present at the hearing, in person and by counsel, 
to see or hear all evidence bearing upon his condition, to present evidence bearing 
upon his competence, to cross-examine witnesses, including the independent physician 
and the visitor, and to trial by jury in open court. The issue may be determined at a 
hearing in chambers without a jury if the alleged incompetent so requests and his 
counsel, the independent physician, and the visitor, approve the request. An order 
adjudicating incompetence may specify a minimum period, not exceeding one year, 
during which no petition for an adjudication of competence may be filed without 
special leave of court. Subject to any such restriction, the incompetent and any person 
interested in his welfare may at any time present a petition or request for an adjudica-
tion of competence. Such a request may be made by informal letter to the court or 
judge. Any person who. shall knowingly interfere or attempt to interfere with the 
making of such a petition or request or its transmission to the court or judge shall. be 
guilty of a felony and shall be imprisoned in the state penitentiary for not less than 
five nor more than fifty years. The -procedure and the rights of the incompetent shall 
be the same in a proceeding on such a •petition or request as upon a petition for ap-
pointment of a guardian of an alleged but unadjudicated incompetent. Adjudications 
under this section have no bearing on the issue of inability to manage property and 
affairs." 
46. MPC § 203. 
47. Ibid. 
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him; and (8) a nominee of an agency which is paying benefits to 
him.48 A person in priorities (2), (3), (5), or (6) may transfer his 
priority to a person with less priority or, if there is no person with 
less priority, to any other person. These provisions are based upon 
the assumption that an adult may be sufficiently incompetent, be-
cause of advanced age or othenvise, to need assistance in caring for 
his person, but still sufficiently competent to have a reasonable pref-
erence as to who shall care for him. The Tentative Draft also has the 
effect of empowering a person who qualifies in all respects, except 
state residency, as the statutory guardian of an infant49 to designate, 
subject to court approval, the person to be appointed guardian. 
The 1946 Model Probate Code gives a guardian of the person 
no power over the property of his ward.50 In order to protect sub-
stantial aggregations of property, the Tentative Draft contemplates 
curatelic proceedings in equity, which are to be wholly separate 
from the guardianship proceeding.51 These proceedings will, of 
course, involve expense and should be unnecessary when the ward's 
only assets are personal effects and a small income from a pension, 
a trust, or insurance proceeds paid in installments. Accordingly, 
the guardian of the person is charged with a duty of caring for 
his ward's clothing, furniture, vehicles, and other personal effects.G2 
Moreover, if curatelic proceedings have not been commenced, the 
guardian is empowered to receive periodic payments voluntarily 
made for the care, support, and benefit of the ward by insurance 
companies, trustees, and federal, state, or municipal agencies.Gs If 
such payments exceed the requirements for the ward's maintenance 
and benefit, the guardian is directed to deposit the excess in an 
insured, interest-bearing bank or savings and loan association ac-
count in the ward's name. The guardian has no authority to make 
withdrawals from these or other accounts in the ward's name or to 
dispose of property other than money. 
The Tentative Draft provides for removal of infants and in-
competents to other states,54 and attempts to discourage the growth 
of a guardianship "racket"55 by restricting the compensation of 
48. FTD § 411. 
49. See note 36 supra and accompanying text. 
50. MPC §§ 219(a), 220. 
51. FTD §§ 401(£)-G), 418-39. 
52. FTD § 413. 
53. FTD § 415. The payor can, as a condition of paying, insist upon curatelic pro• 
ceedings, but voluntary payment to the guardian will discharge his liability. 
54. FTD § 414. 
55. See Regan & Farley, Court Survey, 34 Calif. S.B.J. 73 (1959); Your Unlmown 
Heirs, Harper's Magazine, Aug. 1961, p. 29. 
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visitors, independent lawyers, and independent physicians to small 
fees paid by the county; by denying compensation to a guardian 
who is a spouse, parent, child, or statutory guardian of his ward and 
to all guardians ad litem; by restricting the amount of compensation 
of other guardians; and by prohibiting allowance of compensation 
to relatives and active political supporters of the judge.56 However, 
no one would be so foolhardy as to contend ·that these safeguards are 
certain to succeed. 
IV. PROTECTION OF .PROPERTY OF DISABLED PERSONS 
The systems for protecting the property of disabled persons pro-
vided by the traditional American scheme of guardianship and by 
part IV of the 1946 Model Probate Code have been outlined at the 
beginning of this article. Even if the Uniform Veterans' Guardian-
ship Act is given the narrowest possible construction, so as to limit 
its application to the VA-tainted property of present and former 
beneficiaries of the Veterans Administration, 57 it is evident that a 
modem, efficient, and economical system for protection of the 
property of disabled persons is impossible, so long as that act remains 
in force. Millions of Americans are former beneficiaries of the Vet-
erans Administration in that they have had a tooth pulled at a VA 
facility, received a dividend or payment under a National Service 
Life Insurance policy, or obtained educational benefits or a mort-
gage guarantee under the G.I. Bill. If anyone at any time paid part 
of the purchase price of a piece of property with funds derived 
from the Veterans Administration or its predecessors, that property 
is VA-tainted irrespective of the fact that it has changed hands since 
that purchase.58 Thus, it would seem that if a Revolutionary War 
soldier invested some of his pension in a farm, that farm is VA-
tainted and would be governed by the veterans' guardianship system 
if the present owner is an incompetent who is or has been receiving 
money from the Veterans Administration. Although as a practical 
matter it is impossible in most cases to determine whether a par-
56. FTD § 416. 
57. The key sections are §§ l and 2 (MPC §§ 238, 239). The latter section appears 
to make notice to the Veterans Administration mandatory "in any suit or other pro-
ceeding affecting in any manner the administration by the guardian of the estate of 
any present or former ward whose estate includes assets derived in whole or in part 
from benefits heretofore or hereafter paid by the Veterans Administration." "Ward" is 
defined in the preceding section as "a beneficiary of the Veterans Administration." 
"Veterans Administration" js defined as "the Veterans Administration, its predecessors 
or successors." 
58. Cf. MPC § 238. 
996 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 64:983 
ticular piece of property is VA-tainted, this term probably covers 
most of the property in this country. 
In light of these difficulties, it is not surprising that the First 
Tentative Draft of Revised Part IV, Model Probate Code, proposes 
repeal of the Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act.1iD The Tentative 
Draft would establish only one system for the administration of 
property owned by persons under disability. It is, however, drawn 
in such a way as to make it possible to impose all of the essential 
restrictions of the Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act in a par-
ticular curatelic proceeding. 60 It would seem that the revised part 
IV fully protects all legitimate interests of the Veterans Administra-
tion, while eliminating the confusion and hazards which arise from 
the existence of two divergent systems of guardianship of property. 
Part IV of the 1946 Model Probate Code is restricted to the 
protection of the persons and property of "incompetents." "In-
competent" is defined as any person who is either under the age of 
majority or incapable, by reason of insanity, mental illness, im-
becility, idiocy, senility, habitual drunkenness, excessive use of 
drugs, or other incapacity, of managing his property. or caring for 
himself.61 Although the Tentative Draft does not specifically include 
"idiocy" in its list of disabling conditions, it does repeat the other 
standards of incompetency found in the Model Code, and adds seven 
new categories: physical disability, spendthrift tendencies, imprison-
ment, compulsory hospitalization, confinement in an institution, 
detention by a foreign power, and unknown whereabouts.02 It is 
evident that the property of persons in these seven categories often 
needs protection which they are unable to provide themselves. It 
seems desirable to provide a single well-designed system for the 
protection of the property of all classes of persons who are unable 
to· manage their own. 63 
59. FTD § 440. Section 18 (MPC § 255), which permits the c~mmitment of insane 
persons to the custody of the Veterans Administration instead of to a particular institu-
tion, is excepted from the repeal. 
60. When the disabled person is receiving benefits from the Veterans Administra• 
tion, it is an interested party entitled to initiate curatelic proceedings. FTD §§ 418-19, 
426. If the proceedings are instituted by someone else, it is entitled to notice of and to 
participate in the initial hearing. FTD § 420. It may also request notice of and par• 
ticipate in subsequent hearings. FTD § 421. The powers of a limited protector may be 
restricted to those which a guardian of property would have under the Uniform 
Veterans' Guardianship Act. FTD § 425. He may be required to account periodically 
and submit to a physical check of assets as prescribed by that act. FTD § 428. 
61. MPC § 196(c) . 
. 62. FTD § 401(£). 
63. The Uniform Absence as Evidence of Death and Absentees' Property Act pro• 
vides a system of judicial trusteeship for the property of missing persons. Some states 
have statutes providing for judicial trusteeship of property of imprisoned persons. Sec, 
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The provisions of the Tentative Draft governing adjudication of 
disability to manage property64 are similar to those covering adjudi-
cations of incompetence, which have been quoted and discussed. 65 
The issue is of course different, and there are a few variations in 
the procedure. In this regard, the individual who is allegedly dis-
abled need not be notified personally if he is outside the state.66 
However, notice must be given to any federal, state, or municipal 
agency which is paying him benefits and to at least two, if so many 
can be found, of his children or potential devisees, legatees, heirs, 
and next of kin.67 In addition, the court-appointed visitor must be a 
lawyer.68 There is no right to a jury trial if the alleged disability is 
infancy, imprisonment, compulsory hospitalization, confinement in 
an institution, detention by a foreign power, or unknown where-
abouts. 69 Finally, a recent adjudication of disability in the re-
spondent's state of residence is admissible in proceedings in a 
second state as prima fade proof of disability, but this rule does not 
extend to certificates of incompetency issued by the Veterans Ad-
ministration. 70 It is hoped that these provisions establish adequate 
safeguards against mistaken and unfair .adjudications of disability, 
and also permit an elderly person whose powers are failing to secure 
the appointment of a judicial trustee of his property in a quiet hear-
ing in chambers conducted without publicity.71 
A. Need for Supervision by Courts With General 
Equity Jurisdiction 
Although there is considerable difference of opinion as to the 
types of transactions a guardian should have power to undertake 
without special judicial authorization, most attorneys would agree 
that the power should exist somewhere to approve transactions which 
e.g., Mo. R.Ev. STAT. ch. 460 (1959). Such legislation and any other conflicting statutory 
provisions for protection of the property of persons in any of the categories covered by 
revised part IV should be repealed incident to the enactment of the revision. 
64. FrD §§ 418-20. 
65. See note 45 supra and accompanying text. 
66. FrD § 420. 
67. FrD §§ 420,-426. Failure to give required notice does not deprive the court of 
jurisdiction. FrD § 434(a). 
68. FrD § 40l(k). 
69. FrD § 418. The respondent is entitled to demand a jury trial if the alleged 
disability is mental incompetence, habitual drunkenness, addiction to drugs, senility, 
physical disability, or spendthrift tendencies. However, he may waive tliis right if his 
counsel, the independent physician, and the visitor approve his doing so. 
70. Ibid. 
71. The disabled may petition for his own adjudication or appoint an agent or 
attorney to do so on his behalf. FrD §§ 418-19. 
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are necessary or advantageous for the protection of the ward's prop· 
erty. Yet there are decisions rendered under the traditional Ameri-
can system of guardianship that the courts lack power to authorize 
a lease binding beyond the period of guardianship,72 an exchange 
of lands,73 a sale of land before all personal property has been ex-
hausted,74 a sal~ or release of contingent future interests or ex-
pectancies based upon rights of dower and curtesy,75 the operation 
of an unincorporated business, 76 the payment of medical or funeral 
expenses of the ward's parent,77 the making of gifts,78 the exercise 
of the ward's powers as trustee or donee of a power of appointment,70 
a sale of the ward's property to the guardian or the guardian's 
property to the ward,80 or the prosecution of a suit for the ward's 
divorce. 81 Other decisions have held that the courts cannot even 
ratify transactions which they could have authorized in advance. 82 
Moreover, the 1946 Model Probate Code deprives the courts of 
power to authorize the purchase of a home for a minor ward's 
dependent family,83 the purchase of a home from the guardian,84 a 
sale of the ward's property to the guardian,85 or the acceptance of 
a purchase money mortgage for more than one year.86 
It is evident from the statutes and decisions that legislatures 
and appellate courts have been unwilling to entrust much power 
over property to the courts with guardianship jurisdiction. One 
reason for this unwillingness probably stems from the fact that a 
number of-states have constitutional provisions conferring guardian-
ship jurisdiction on inferior courts presided over by judges who are 
not necessarily well qualified to handle complex problems of prop• 
72. See cases collected in Fratcher, Powers and Duties of Guardians of Property, 45 
IOWA L. REv. 264, 301 n.138 (1960). 
73. Id. at 303; cf. Alexander v. Windsor, 107 Mont. 152, 81 P.2d 685 (1938), suggest• 
ing that the courts lacked power to authorize a guardian of property to exchange sheep 
for calves. 
74. Fratcher, supra note 72, at 306. 
75. Id. at 305-06. 
76. Id. at 313. 
77. Id. at 315-16. 
78. Id. at 316. 
79. Id. at 318. 
80. Id. at 320-24. 
81. Id. at 320. 
82. Id. at 272; cf. UNIFORM VETERANS' GUAIU>IANSHIP Acr § 13 (MPC § 250): MPC 
§ 225(a). 
83. MPC §§ 226, 252. 
84. Ibid. 
85. MPC § 230(b). This subsection does, however, empower the court to authorize a 
guardian who is the spouse, parent, child, brother, or sister of his ward and a cotenant 
with the ward in the property to purchase at public sale. 
86. MPC §§ 154, 230(c). The mortgage may not exceed 50% of the purchase price, 
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erty law.B7 The draftsmen of the 1946 Model Probate Code urged 
that jurisdiction thereunder be conferred on trial courts of general 
jurisdiction or at least on courts with equally well-qualified judges.BB 
Their plea has had little effect, but this result is not surprising in 
view of the difficulty of securing a constitutional amendment which 
would disturb vested political interests in a field that the public 
does not understand. The only practicable solution to the problem 
of the justifiable unwillingness of legislatures and appellate courts 
to permit courts with guardianship jurisdiction to exercise adequate 
power over property is to remove the whole subject of protection 
of the property of persons under disability from the ambit of 
guardianship and place it where it has always been in England-in 
the courts of equity jurisdiction. This should ensure a competent 
judge whose powers the legislature will agree to enhance and the 
appellate courts to respect. For the foregoing reasons the Tentative 
Draft provides that curatelic proceedings are within the general 
equity jurisdiction.89 
B. The Need for Broaq, Judicial Authority 
The First Tentative Draft provides that "after it has adjudged 
that a person is disabled the court shall have all those powers over 
the property and affairs of the curatel90 and other persons which the 
curate! himself could exercise if of age, not disabled, and present."91 
87. In Missouri, for example, guardianship jurisdiction is vested in probate courts. 
Mo. CONST. art. V, § 16. In rural counties the probate judge is also the magistrate 
(justice of the peace). Mo. CONST. art. V, § 18. Thus, he spends most of his time dis-
ciplining drunkards and drivers of overweight trucks. Moreover, he is elected on a 
partisan basis for a four-year term, and the statutory salary is only $6,600 per annum. 
Mo. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 481.110 (1959), § 482.150(1)(1) (Supp. 1965); Mo. Laws 1965, H.B. 
No. 364, § I. Although he must be a lawyer, he may not practice law. Mo. CONST. 
art. V, §§ 24, 25 (1945). See Simes &: Basye, The Organization of the Probate Court in 
America (pts. I &: 2), 42 MICH. L. R.Ev. 965 (1944), 43 id. 113, 137-54 (1944), in SIMES, 
MODEL PROBATE CODE 385, 466-88 (1946). 
88. MPC § 4 and comment; SIMES, MODEL PROBATE CODE 15 (1946). 
89. FTD § 402. Revised Part IV has been drafted on the assumption that jurisdiction 
over guardianship of the person may not necessarily be vested in the same court that 
has jurisdiction over protection of the property of persons under disability. If both 
types of jurisdiction are vested in the same court, which is desirable so long as it is not 
an inferior court, provision should be made for the hearing of guardianship and 
curatelic matters at the same time. For example, a hearing on the issue of incompetence 
under FTD § 407 could be· combined with one on the issue of disability to manage 
property under FTD § 418, with considerable saving of time and expense. 
90. FTD § 401(g) defines "curate!" as "a person who has been adjudged to be dis-
abled." This term was taken from the Roman civil law, and it is broad enough to 
include anyone whose property is managed by a fiduciary. As the disabled person may 
be neither an infant nor a mental incompetent, the terms "ward" and "incompetent" 
would seem to be inappropriate. 
91. FTD § 422. This sentence was suggested by the Mental Health Act, 1959, 7 &: 8 
Eliz. 2, c. 72, § 102. 
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This broad grant of judicial power is the most important provision 
of the entire draft. It is designed to ensure that courts have authority 
to do every act which ought to be done in connection with the 
property and affairs of a person who is under disability. This general 
grant of authority is limited, however, by a more specific direction: 
The court will exercise, or direct the exercise, of its powers 
to exercise or release powers of appointment of which the curate! 
is donee, to make gifts exceeding one year's income of the 
curatelic property, to make, modify and revoke wills and codicils 
of the curate!, to create trusts of the curatelic property which 
, may last longer than his disability or life, and to sue for dissolu-
tion of his marriage, only if satisfied, after notice and hearing, 
that the curate!, if of age, not disabled and present, would 
do so himself.92 
The judicial powers just quoted do not exist under present 
American law, but the creation of such authority is necessary if the 
property of disabled persons is to be protected against ruinous taxa-
tion. An estate plan may become very much out of date because of 
changes in the family and property of a person who is under dis-
ability for an extended period, and changes in tax legislation may 
make an old estate plan highly disadvantageous. In this regard, the 
Tentative Draft would make it possible to bring the curatel's estate 
plan up to date or, if he had none before he became disabled, to 
give him one which will provide for his dependents and prevent 
undue shrinkage of his estate at death due to estate and inheritance 
taxes. Similarly, the provisions of the Tentative Draft would permit 
a disabled person to divorce a spouse who has abandoned or mal-
treated him and thereby cut off the spouse's right to support, forced 
share, and other marital rights in property. 
C. The Role of a "Protector" 
Under the Tentative Draft a court may act, after adjudication, 
·directly or through a protector or limited protector appointed by 
it.98 The priorities for appointment as protector or limited pro-
92. FTD § 423. 
93. FTD § 422. "Protector" is defined as "one appointed by a court to manage the 
property and affairs of a curate!." "Limited protector" is defined as "one whose letters 
of protectorship limit his powers." FTD § 401(h). "Protector" was the title of the 
official who exercised the powers of the Crown during the minority or other disability 
of a mediaeval English king. The term has been used in English conveyancing in the 
form "protector of the settlement." It has, however, no connotations which make it 
unsuitable for use as the distinctive appellation for a judicially appointed trustee of the 
property of a person under disability who may be neither an infant nor a mental in-
competent. 
In the case of some small estates, even the appointment of a protector or limited 
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tector are similar to those for appointment as guardian of the per-
son, 94 and either a corporation or a, natural person may qualify as 
the protector of a curatel.95 The protector assumes title, in 'trust, to 
the curatel's property, and he has all the powers conferred upon 
trustees by the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act,96 the same powers of 
investment as a custodian under section 4(e) of the Uniform Gifts 
to Minors Act, and any additional powers of investment conferred 
by law on other trustees in the.state. The Uniform Trustees' Powers 
Act confers upon a trustee "power to perform, without court au-
thorization, every act which a prudent man would perform for the 
purposes of the trust."97 Section 4(e) of the Uniform Gifts to Minors 
protector may be unnecessary. For example, the court could entrust the care of the 
curatel's home and furniture to a relative who agrees to pay taxes and make repairs 
while the curate! is in the asylum, and the court could give custody of his securities 
and jewelry to a bank. · 
94. FrD § 426. The order of preference is as follows: (1) the nominee of the curatel 
if he has reached eighteen and has sufficient mental capacity to make an intelligent 
choice; (2) his spouse; (3) his parents; (4) a nominee named in the will of a deceased 
parent; (5) his children; (6) his potential devisees, legatees, heirs and next of kin; (7) 
the nominee of a person or institution caring for him; and (8) the nominee of an 
agency which is paying benefits to him (e.g., the Veterans Administration). A person in 
priority (2), (3), (5), or (6) may transfer his priority to a corporation, a person with 
lower priority, or, if there is no person with lower priority, to any other person. These 
provisions attempt to place the selection of the protector in the hands of the person 
most interested in the proper protection of the curatel's property. 
95. FrD § 424. 
96, 1964 HANDBOOK OF NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE 
LAws 265,267. This provision was enacted by IDAHO CODE§§ 68-104 to -113 (Supp. 1965) 
and Wvo. STAT. ANN. §§ 4-36 to -45 (Supp. 1965), An earlier but similar draft was en• 
acted as FLA, STAT. ANN, ch. 691 (1944); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, §§ 175.1-.53 (1963); 
TEx. REY. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 7425b (1960). The New York Fiduciaries' Powers Act, 
N.Y, DECED. Esr. I.Aw § 127, is also similar. 
97. UNIFORM TRUSTEES' PoWERS Acr § 3(a). For the theory behind this broad grant 
of power, see Fratcher, Trustees' Powers Legislation, 37 N.Y.U.L. REY. 627 (1962). The 
powers conferred by § 3(a) include, but are not limited to, those enumerated in § 3(c), 
as follows: 
(c) A trustee has the power, subject to subsections (a) and (b): 
(1) to collect, hold, and retain trust assets received from a trustor until, in the 
judgment of the trustee, disposition of the assets should be made; and the assets 
may be retained even though they include an asset in which the trustee is per-
sonally interested; 
(2) to receive additions to the assets of the trust; . 
(3) to continue or participate in the operation of any business or other enter-
prise, and to effect incorporation, dissolution, or other change in the form of the 
organization of the business or enterprise; 
(4) to acquire an undivided interest in a trust asset in which the trustee, in any 
trust capacity, holds an undivided interest; . 
(5) to invest and reinvest trust assets in accordance with the provisions of the 
trust or as provided by law; 
(6) to deposit trust funds in a bank, including a bank operated by the trus.tee; 
(7) to acquire or dispose of an asset, for cash or on credit, at public or private 
sale; and to manage, develop, improve, exchange, partition, change the character 
of, or abandon a trust asset or any interest therein; and to encumber, mortgage, or 
pledge a trust asset for a term within or extending beyond the term of the trust, 
m connection with the exercise of any power vested in the trustee; 
(8) to make ordinary or extraordinary repairs or alterations in buildings or 
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Act empowers custodians, without court authorization or approval, 
to "invest and reinvest the custodial property as would a prudent 
man of discretion anp. intelligence who is seeking a reasonable in-
come and the preservation of his capital, except that he may, in his 
discretion and without liability to the minor or his estate, retain a 
security given to the minor .... "98 Under the Tentative Draft, the 
foregoing powers of a protector may be exercised by him without 
special authorization or confirmation by the court.90 Thus it is 
other structures, to demolish any improvements, to raze existing or erect new 
party walls or buildings; 
(9) to subdivide, develop, or dedicate land to public use; or to make or obtain 
the vacation of plats and adjust boundaries, or to adjust differences in valuation 
on exchange or partition by giving or receiving consideration; or to dedicate ease• 
ments to public use without consideration; • 
(10) to enter for any purpose into a lease as lessor or lessee with or without 
option to purchase or renew for a term within or extending .beyond the term of 
the trust; 
(11) to enter into a lease or arrangement for exploration and removal of 
minerals or other natural resources or enter into a pooling or unitization agree• 
ment; 
(12) to grant an option involving disposition of a trust asset, or to take an 
option for the acquisition of any asset; 
(13) to vote a security, in person or by general or limited proxy; 
(14) to pay calls, assessments, and any other sums chargeable or accruing against 
or on account of securities; 
(15) to sell or exercise stock subscription or conversion rights; to consent, di-
rectly or through a committee or other agent, to the reorganization, consolidation, 
merger, dissolution, or liquidation of a corporation or other business enterprise; 
(16) to hold a security in the name of a nominee or in other form without 
disclosure of the trust, so that title to the security may pass by delivery, but the 
trustee is liable for any act of the nominee in connection with the stock so held; 
(17) to insure the assets of the trust against damage or loss, and the trustee 
against liability with respect to third persons; 
(18) to borrow money to be repaid from trust assets or otherwise; to advance 
·money for the protection of the trust, and for all expenses, losses, and liability 
sustained in the administration of the trust or because of the holding or owner• 
ship of any trust assets, for which advances with any interest the trustee has a lien 
on the trust assets as against the beneficiary; 
(19) to pay or contest any claim; to settle a claim by or against the trust by 
compromise, arbitration, or otherwise; and to release, in whole or in part, any 
claim belonging to the trust to the extent that the claim is uncollectible; 
(20) to pay taxes, assessments, compensation of the trustee, and other expenses 
incurred in the collection, care, administration, and protection of the trust; 
(21) to allocate items of income or expense to either trust income or principal, 
as provided by law, including creation of reserves out of income for depreciation, 
obsolescence, or amortization, or for depletion in mineral or timber properties; 
(22) to pay any sum distributable to a beneficiary under legal disability, without 
liability to the trustee, by -~aying the sum to the beneficiary or by paying the sum 
for the use of the benefioary either to a legal representative appomted by the 
court, or if none, to a relative; 
(23) to effect distribution of .property and money in divided or undivided in• 
terests and to adjust resulting differences in valuation; 
(24) to employ persons, including attorneys, auditors, investment advisors, or 
agents, even if they are associated with the trustee, to advise or assist the trustee in 
•the performance of his administrative duties; to act without independent investi• 
gation upon their recommendations; and instead of acting personally, to employ one 
or more agents to perform any act of administration, whether or not discretionary; 
(25) to prosecute or defend actions, claims, or proceedings for the protection of 
trust assets and of the trustee in the performance of his duties; 
(26) to execute and deliver all instruments which will accomplish or facilitate 
tlie exercise of the powers vested in tlie trustee. 
98. 9B UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 186 (1957). 
99. ITD § 424. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1853 permits tlie court to authorize a conservator 
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within a protector's discretion to sell, mortgage, or lease any of the 
curatelic property and make any investment permitted by the broad 
"prudent man rule." Consequently, in most cases there will be no 
necessity for any judicial proceedings whatever between the time 
the protector is appointed and the time the curatel comes of age, 
ceases to be disabled, or dies. 
The broad, independently exercisable powers of a protector 
should, of course, be conferred only upon a corporation or person 
whose competence, integrity, and financial responsibility are ade-
quate. When the qualifications of such a fiduciary are less than 
adequate or when an interested party, such as the Veterans Adminis-
tration, so requests, the court may, instead of appointing a protector, 
appoint a natural person as limited protector.100 A limited protector 
has all the title and powers of a protector, except those specifically 
withheld from him by the terms of his letters of protectorship. The 
letters may limit his title and powers to a part of the curatel's 
property, but more commonly they would require him to secure 
special court authorization for important transactions, such as sales, 
mortgages, and long-term leases of land. In the latter case, a limited 
protector would be in a position similar to that_ of a guardian of 
property under the law currently in force in most states, except that 
he would have title to the property. The purpose of giving protectors 
and limited protectors title as trustees is to give full ·effect to the 
provisions of the act protecting third parties who deal with them or 
who purchase ,property that has been conveyed by them.101 
The Tentative Draft provides that the liability of a protector or 
limited protector to the curate! or his estate for breach of duty is 
confined to actual damages.102 This provision is designed to overrule 
decisions that a trustee or guardian who fails to invest the assets 
under his supervision is liable to the beneficiary or ward for amounts 
in excess of that which could have been earned by proper invest-
ment.103 It also provides that a protector or limited protector is not 
liable to the curate! or the curatel's estate for losses which are not 
caused by his breach of duty.104 This provision is designed to over-
of the property of a mental incompetent to exercise very broad powers, approximating 
those of an owner, without court authorization, confirmation, or approval of particular 
transactions. 
100. FrD § 425. 
IOI. See note 130 infra and accompanying text. 
102. FTD § 428. Sections 172(c) and 233 of the MPC may accomplish this result but 
their language is not clear on the point. 
103. See, e.g., Wight v. Lee, 101 Conn. 401, 126 Atl. 218 (1924); Lipic v. Wheeler, 362 
Mo. 499, 242 S.W.2d 43 (1951); cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 181, comment c, 
§ 207(1), comment b (1959). 
104. FTD § 428. Compare MPC §§ 172(c), 233. 
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rule decisions holding that a fiduciary who fails to earmark trust 
property,105 wrongfully delegates control over the trust property to 
another,106 or sells his own property to the trust,107 is liable for losses 
which occur to the property even though there is no causal connec-
tion between the breach of duty and the loss. 
For purposes of personal liability to third persons, the protector 
or limited protector is treated as if he were the manager of a cor-
poration. In the absence of a special agreement, he is not personally 
liable on contracts properly entered into in his fiduciary capacity in 
the course of administration of the trust. Similarly, he is not per-
sonally liable for obligations arising from possession or ownership 
of the curatelic property or for torts committed in the course of the 
administration of the trust, unless he is personally at fault.108 These 
provisions are designed to abolish the existing rules that a trustee is 
personally liable on contracts entered into in his fiduciary capacity 
and that he is personally liable, on a respondeat superior theory, for 
the torts of servants properly employed by him in the administration 
of the trust.109 • 
D. Claims by Third Parties 
The 1946 Model Probate Code permits a person who has a claim 
against the estate of a ward, whether based on a liability of the ward 
which arose prior to the guardianship or an obligation properly 
incurred by the guardian for the benefit of the ward or his estate, 
and whether arising in contract, tort, or othenvise, to file the claim 
in the guardianship proceeding.11° This expeditious procedure is a 
real improvement over the common-law rule that liabilities of the 
ward had to be established in a separate action against him, with 
consequent difficulties of collection from assets in the custody of the 
guardianship court.111 It is an even greater improvement over the 
common-law rule that claims under contracts made by the guardian, 
and for torts committed by his servants, had to be enforced by an 
action at law against the guardian personally, so that the ward's 
105. Estate of Arguello, 97 Cal. 196, 31 Pac. 937 (1893); Hanvard v. Robinson, 14 
Ill. App. 560 (1884); McAllister v. Commonwealth, 30 Pa. St. 536 (1858); Williams v. 
Williams, 55 Wis. 300, 12 N.W. 465 (1882). 
106. In re Estate of Wood, 159 Cal. 466, 114 Pac. 992, 36 L.R.A. (n.s.) 252 (1911). 
107. Cornet v. Cornet, 269 Mo. 298, 190 S.W. 333 (1916). 
108. FI'D § 431. To this end, the contrary provisions of §§ 12(3) and 14(4) of the 
Uniform Trusts Act are made inapplicable to protectors and limited protectors. 
109. See RE.sTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS §§ 261-65 (1959); cf. UNIFORM TRUSTS Acr 
§§ 12-14. · 
110. MPC § 227; cf. UNIFORM TRUSTS Acr §§ 12, 14. 
111. See Fratcher, Powers and Duties of Guardians of Property, 45 IOWA L. REV, 
264, 297-99 (1960). 
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estate could be reached only by a suit in equity for subrogation to 
the guardian's right to exo:i;ieration, after exhaustion of all remedies 
against the guardian's individual property.112 
The Tentative Draft preserves these progressive features of the 
1946 Code,118 and also provides that the protector should pay all 
claims against the curate! and against himself as protector, without 
filing in the curatelic proceeding unless it appears that the claim 
lacks merit or that payment would reduce the curatelic property to 
an amount insufficient to ensure adequate support· of the curate! 
and his dependents.114 In the latter event the court may defer pay-
ment, and it may direct the protector to give the claimant a mortgage 
or other security on the curatelic property to secure payment of,the 
claim at some future date.115 All actions pending against the curate! 
as sole defendant at the time he is found to be disabled are 
consolidated into the curatelic proceeding, and all subsequent actions 
against him as sole defendant must be by way of claim in that 
proceeding.116 A protector may, by advertising for claims against 
the curate! and the curatelic property, bar those not presented within 
four months after publication of the advertisement.117 By this means, 
the protector can inform himself promptly of the real value of the 
curatel's net estate. 
E. Legal Disabilities Imposed Upon Curatels 
There is considerable doubt in many jurisdictions about the 
extent to which the appointment of a guardian of property deprives 
the ward of capacity to enter into transactions affecting that prop-
erty. The 1946 Model Probate Code contains no provision on this 
112. Id. at 299-300; see Fulda & Pond, Tort Liability of Trust Estates, 41 CoLUM. 
L. REv. 1332 (1941); Scott, Liabilities Incurred in the Administration of Trusts, 28 
HARV. L. REv. 725 (1915); Stone, A Theory of Liability of Trust Estates for the Con-
tracts and Torts of the Trustee, 22 CoLUM. L. REv. 527 (1922); cf. UNIFORM TRusrs 
Acr, §§ 12, 14; R.EsrATEMENT (SECOND), TRusrs §§ 266-73 (1959). 
113. FTD § 431. 
114. Ibid. 
115. Ibid. 
116. Ibid. Actions pending at the time of adjudication of disability in which the 
curate! is a co-defendant may proceed in the court in which started, and, after such 
adjudication, actions against the curate! as co-defendant may be commenced in another 
court, with the consent of the court in which the curatelic proceeding is pending. 
However, writs of execution and garnishment may not be levied on curatelic property, 
and it may not be reached by judicial process issued other than in the curatelic pro-
_ceeding. An action in another court against the curatel as co-defendant is, of course, 
defended by the protector. Ibid. 
117. FTD § 432. The comment to MPC § 227 says that such provisions are "believed 
to be undesirable." However, such a provision has been found useful in England. 
Trustee Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 19, § 27. 
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point. Since the Tentative Draft permits curatelic proceedings with 
respect to the property of persons other than infants and mental 
incompetents,118 it seemed desirable to specify in some detail the 
disabilities of a curate!. The applicable section provides that: 
After an adjudication of disability the curatel is incapable 
of making a gift, of conveying, encumbering or making any 
charge on his property and of binding himself or his property 
by any contract, other than a contract for necessaries for him-
self or his dependents .... The curatel lacks capacity to marry; 
to sue or be sued; to make, modify or revoke a will or codicil; 
to exercise a power of appointment; to exercis-e powers as 
trustee, protector, personal representative, custodian for a minor 
or attorney in fact; and to create, modify or terminate a 
trust ... .119 
These provisions constitute a drastic, perhaps too drastic, deprival 
of the curate! of virtually all power to bind hims-elf and his prop-
erty. In view of the breadth of the incapacity imposed and the fact 
that a curate! may be a mentally sound adult who has no knowledge 
of his adjudication of disability (as in the case of a missing person 
or a person imprisoned or detained in a foreign country), some 
additional provision is necessary to avoid unfairness and hardship. 
For example, if during the course of a missing person's absence he 
marries, makes a will in favor of his spouse, and then dies, the 
marriage and the will would be nullities under this section even 
though neither the curate! nor his wife knew of his adjudication of 
disability. Consequently, the section provides that the court may 
confirm any transaction, including a marriage, before or after the 
death of the curatel.120 
V. PROTECTION FOR THIRD PERSONS 
It was suggested above that the most important provision of the 
Tentative Draft is the broad grant of authority to the courts, giving 
them the same degree of power over the curatel's property and 
affairs as the curate! himself could exercise if he were of age, not 
118. See text accompanying note 62 supra. 
119. FTD § 430. As a matter of constitutional and international law, this section 
probably could not invalidate a marriage, as such, entered into by a sane curate} in 
another state or country. It could, however, effectively deprive the other party to the 
marriage of marital rights in curatelic property within the state. Similarly, although it 
could not, perhaps, make a will executed in another state or country a complete nullity, 
it could make it ineffective as to the curatelic ·property in the state. 
120. Ibid. The court also may authorize any such transaction in advance, and the 
protector may authorize or confirm the transactions listed in the first sentence of FTD 
§ 430, which is quoted in the text accompanying note 119 supra. 
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disabled, and present.121 Correlative to this, and next in importance, 
is the section on protection of third parties.122 As previously noted, 
under the traditional American system of guardianship of property 
a guardian is deterred, by his lack of adequate powers and his 
doubt as to the court's power to authorize any but a few routine 
transactions, from entering into many transactions which would be 
advantageous to the estate.123 This feature of the traditional system, 
which tends to make a guardian of property an inactive preserver of 
the status quo instead of an active, dynamic, efficient manager of 
the estate, is complemented and buttressed by the traditional rules 
respecting third parties who have the temerity to deal with guardians 
of property. Even if a guardian has express court authorization to 
give a deed, mortgage, or lease, the other party to the transaction has 
no protection whatever if the court lacked power to give the 
authorization or there was an irregularity in the proceedings.124 
Therefore, an innocent purchaser who pays a full and adequate price 
at a judicially ordered sale and receives a guardian's deed gets 
nothing if the guardian fails to file a prescrib~d oath, secure a 
routine order of confirmation, or take some other technical ·pro-
cedural step requiretl by statute. That is, the ward can recover the 
land from the purchaser, and the purchaser cannot recover the 
purchase price from the ward or his estate, except to the extent that 
he can show that the money is still in the hands of the guardian or 
ward or has been properly applied to the use of the ward. A third 
person who enters into a transaction with a guardian who has not 
received court authorization to convey the ward's property is in an 
even worse position. Since a guardian does not have title to the.=; 
property under his supervision, the bona fide purchaser doctrine 
probably does not protect persons who purchase from him.125 Thus, 
if the guardian lacked power to make the transfer, the purchaser has 
no protection, even though the most diligent inquiry would not have 
revealed this deficiency. The task of a title examiner with a guard-
ian's deed in the chain of title is a nightmare. 
The Tentative Draft provides that after the filing of a petition 
for adjudication of disability: 
[T]he court has jurisdiction over every interest, legal or equi-
table, in, and every power over, property, to which the alleged 
121. See note 91 supra and accompanying text. 
122. FI'D § 434. 
123. See text accompanying notes 6-ll, 72-86 supra. 
124. See Fratcher, supra note Ill, at 307. 
125. See id. at 309-10. As this authority indicates, there is a great deal of confusion 
in this area. 
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disabled was entitled at the time of such filing or to which he 
thereafter became entitled, notwithstanding that the alleged dis• 
abled is not in fact disabled, that the form, content or verifica-
tion of the petition is defective, or that any notice required by 
law has been omitted or defectively served .... Every disposi-
tion and encumbrance of any such interest, and every exercise 
of any such power, made or directed by the court while it has 
jurisdiction, shall bind the alleged disabled, and all persons 
claiming through or under him, to the same extent as if it had 
been done by him while of full age and not disabled.126 
This provision confers quasi-in-rem jurisdiction over property 
of the disabled which is located in the state. Letters of protectorship 
and court orders authorizing land transactions may be recorded.121 
As between a purchaser who relies on the record and the alleged 
disabled (and all persons who claim through or under him), the 
recording of letters or an order creates a conclusive presumption 
that the court had jurisdiction to issue the letters or order.128 The 
Tentative Draft also provides that persons who deal with or assist 
a protector in the conduct of a transaction are protected by section 
7 of the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act, which states: 
With respect to a third person dealing with a trustee or as-
sisting a trustee in the conduct of a transaction, the existence of 
trust powers and their proper exercise by the trustee may be 
assumed without inquiry. The third person is not bound to 
inquire whether the trustee has power to act or is properly 
exercising the power; and a third person, without actual knowl-
edge that the trustee is exceeding his powers or improperly 
exercising them, is fully protected in dealing with the trustee 
as if the trustee possessed and properly exercised the powers 
he purports to exercise .... 120 
Purchasers and other persons who deal with a limited protector 
have no duty to inquire into his powers, except to examine his 
letters of authority. In the absence of imputed knowledge arising 
from this very limited duty of inquiry or actual knowledge that the 
transaction is unauthorized or improper, such a person is deemed 
to be in good faith. A person who contracts with, or receives a trans-
fer of a legal or equitable interest in curatelic property from, a 
protector or limited protector, in good faith and for value paid 
or promised, is entitled to keep the property or enforce the contract, 
126. FTD § 434(a). 
127. FTD § 430. 
128. FTD § 434(a). 
129. FTD § 434(b). See also 1964 HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COM• 
MISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 271. 
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free of all claims of the curate!, the protector, and their successors 
in interest.180 This rule applies irrespective of any failure to give 
required notice, or any other procedural irregularity in the appoint-
ment of the protector or limited protector, or in the proceeding 
through which he was authorized to act.181 Persons who assist or 
participate with a protector or limited protector in the conduct of 
a transaction incur no liability to the curatel, unless they have actual 
knowledge that the transaction is unauthorized or improper.182 
The provisions already discussed would seem to indicate that a 
title examiner need insist on nothing in an abstract to support a 
protector's deed, except the letters of protectorship. However, the 
Tentative Draft was written by a former fly-specking title examiner 
who, out of an abundance of caution, added further provisions to 
protect subsequent purchasers.133 These state expressly that a pur-
chaser from anyone claiming under a deed given by a protector 
or limited protector has no duty to inquire into the regularity of 
the curatelic proceedings or the propriety of the transaction and 
may assume, in the absence of actual knowledge to the contrary, 
that the protector had the power purportedly conferred upon 
him by his recorded letters and that he exercised it properly. 
Since the_ protector or limited protector had legal title, such a 
purchaser is a bona fide purchaser for value who acquires title 
free of all equities of the curatel and persons claiming under 
him. One claiming through or under a bona fide purchaser has a 
good title, notwithstanding any knowledge that the transaction with 
the protector was unauthorized, improper, or irregular. 
The provisions for the protection of third_ parties who deal with 
a protector or derive title through him are not designed solely for 
130. FrD § 434(b). 
131. Ibid. 
132. Ibid. In the absence of such legislation, corporations which register transfers 
of securities to or from fiduciaries, brokers who effect such transfers and, in some cases, 
bankers who honor checks drawn by fiduciaries, have been charged with a duty of 
mquiry into the powers of the fiduciary and the propriety of their exercise, and sub-
jected to liability if such inquiry would have revealed a breach of fiduciary duty. See 
Braucher, Security Transfers by Fiduciaries, 43 MINN. L. REv. 193 (1958); Conard, 
A New Deal for Fiduciaries' Stock Transfers, 56 MICH. L. R.Ev. 843 (1958); Fratcher, 
supra note 111, at 326-27; Fratcher, Trustees' Powers _Legislation, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 
646-49 (1962): Merrill, Bankers' Liability for Deposits of a Fiduciary to His Personal 
Account, 40 ~v. L. R.Ev. 1077 (1927); Scott, Participation in a Breach of Trust, 34 
HARV. L. REv. 454 (1921); cf. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 8-304, ·318, -401 to -403; 
UNIFORM FIDUCIARIES Acr §§ 3, 7, 9; UNIFORM GIFTS TO MINORS Acr § 6; UNIFORM Acr 
FOR SIMPLIFICATION OF FIDUCIARY SECURITY TRANSFERS §§ 3, 7; UNIFORM TRUSTEES' 
POWERS Acr § 7; UNIFORM LAw COMMISSIONERS' MODEL SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY 
FOR SMALL PROPERTY INTERESTS Acr § 6(c); REsTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 326 (1959). 
133. FTD § 434(c). 
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their benefit. These measures are also intended to benefit the 
curatel. Under existing law, transactions with guardians of property 
are so hazardous that guardians sometimes are unable to find any-
one willing to deal with them and often find themselves obliged to 
deal on terms much less advantageous to the ward than those which 
an owner in his own right could obtain. It is hoped that the 
removal of these unreasonable hazards from transactions with pro-
tectors will enable protectors to secure, in transactions with third 
parties, as advantageous terms as could a beneficial o·wner. If a pro-
tector exceeds or abuses his powers, he will be liable to the curatel,184 
and any judgment against the protector will be collectible from his 
bond.135 
The First Tentative Draft of Revised Part IV, Model Probate 
Code, may be changed beyond recognition in the hands of the 
Reporting Staff, its two guiding committees, and the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Perhaps it should 
be. If this proposed draft is of assistance in the task of promulgating 
new uniform guardianship legislation containing a clear solution to 
each of the problems which have been discussed, it will have served 
a useful purpose. The bane of the law of guardianship of property 
has been that since their powers are so doubtful, guardians and courts 
have been afraid to act in many situations where action was ob-
viously needed to protect the property in their care. In many situ-
ations any clear rule would be better than the prevailing uncertainty. 
134. FTD § 428. 
135. FTD § 427 provides that a natural person who is serving as a protector or 
limited protector may be required to furnish a bond in the amount of the aggregate 
capital value of the curatelic property in his control plus one year's estimated income. 
Sureties or other security for the performance of the bond, such as a pledge of 
securities or a mortgage of land, may be required. 
